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Risk Aversion and Compliance in Markets for Pollution Control 
 
 
Abstract: This paper examines the effects of risk aversion on compliance choices in markets for 
pollution control. A firm’s decision to be compliant or not is independent of its manager’s risk 
preference. However, noncompliant firms with risk averse managers will have lower violations 
than otherwise identical firms with risk neutral managers. The violations of noncompliant firms 
with risk averse managers are independent of differences in their benefits from emissions and 
their initial allocations of permits if and only if their managers’ utility functions exhibit constant 
absolute risk aversion. However, firm-level characteristics do impact violation choices when 
managers have coefficients of absolute risk aversion that are increasing or decreasing in profit 
levels. Finally, in the equilibrium of a market for emissions rights with widespread 
noncompliance, risk aversion is associated with higher permit prices, better environmental 
quality, and lower aggregate violations.  
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1. Introduction 
One of the most important design elements of any regulatory policy is how compliance to the 
policy will be enforced. Within the context of designing market-based pollution control policies, 
several authors have provided theoretical analyses of compliance incentives, the consequences of 
noncompliance, and the design of enforcement strategies  (e.g., Keeler 1991, Malik 1990, 1992, 
and 2002, vanEgteren and Weber 1996, Stranlund and Dhanda 1999, Stranlund and Chavez 
2000, Chavez and Stranlund 2003, Stranlund, Costello and Chavez 2005).  Taken as a whole, this 
literature suggests that firms’ incentives toward noncompliance under market-based regulations, 
as well as the design of enforcement strategies to counteract these incentives, are quite different 
from compliance and enforcement of other policy instruments, particularly command-and-
control regulations.  
An important question for enforcers of environmental policies is whether differences in 
the characteristics of firms generate different compliance choices. One may suspect that firms 
with different production processes, abatement technologies, or initial allocations of emissions 
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rights may have different compliance incentives. If this is true, then regulators will be motivated 
to choose a targeted enforcement strategy, in particular targeted monitoring effort, which is 
conditioned on firm-level characteristics. 
However, Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) have shown that the individual compliance 
choices of risk neutral competitive firms in emissions trading programs are independent of 
differences in any firm-level characteristic. Consequently, regulators have no reason to condition 
their enforcement effort on firm-level characteristics.  Their reasoning is straightforward. Since 
compliance in emissions trading programs means that a firm holds enough permits to cover its 
emissions, a risk neutral competitive firm’s marginal benefit of noncompliance is what it has to 
spend for permits to make sure it is compliant; that is, the prevailing permit price. A firm’s 
compliance decision is made by comparing this permit price with the marginal expected penalty 
for emissions in excess of permits.  Since this marginal benefit-cost comparison does not depend 
on anything unique to a particular firm, the compliance decision is independent of any firm 
characteristic.  
This independence result contrasts sharply with the effects of firm-level characteristics on 
compliance with command-and-control standards, under which firms with higher marginal 
emissions control costs or that face stricter emissions standards will have a greater incentive to 
be noncompliant. In this way, firm-level characteristics are important determinants of 
compliance with fixed standards (Garvie and Keeler 1994). A recent paper by Gray and 
Shadbegian (2005) finds strong support for this conclusion in their analysis of compliance 
behavior by pulp and paper manufacturers.  
The independence of firms’ violation choices on their individual characteristics under 
market-based regulations clearly depends, at least in part, on the assumption of risk-neutrality. 
 3
However, no one has addressed the question of whether this independence result holds with risk-
averse decision makers.  In the theoretical literature on compliance and enforcement of emissions 
trading only Malik (1990) allows for non-neutral risk preferences. However, he does not provide 
the qualitative impacts of firms’ benefits from emissions (i.e., emissions control costs) or their 
initial allocations of permits on violation choices. Doing so is the primary objective of this paper. 
Moreover, since market-based regulations are unique in that the compliance decisions of firms 
are linked together through the market for property rights, it is important to understand how risk 
aversion affects equilibrium decisions and market outcomes.  
Several new results about compliance behavior under tradable property rights policies are 
derived in this paper.  After laying out a model of a firm’s compliance decisions under a 
competitive emissions trading program in the next section, section 3 contains an analysis of the 
effects of risk aversion on compliance behavior. I first demonstrate that a firm’s decision about 
whether to comply or not is independent of its manager’s risk preference. Thus, if the 
enforcement objective is to achieve full compliance to an emissions trading program, the 
distribution of risk preferences among the managers of firms has no bearing on the strategy 
required to achieve this objective. Moreover, a targeted enforcement strategy with which firms 
with certain characteristics are monitored more closely than others is not justified. 
Risk preferences do play a role in determining the violations of noncompliant firms. Not 
surprisingly, noncompliant firms with risk averse managers will have lower violations than 
otherwise identical firms with risk neutral managers. However, the violations of noncompliant 
firms with risk averse managers are independent of differences in their benefits from emissions 
and their initial allocations of permits if and only their managers’ utility functions exhibit 
constant absolute risk aversion. On the other hand, firm-level characteristics do impact violation 
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choices when managers have coefficients of absolute risk aversion that are increasing or 
decreasing in profit levels.  
 In principle, therefore, a regulator could target its enforcement effort when there is 
widespread noncompliance in an emissions trading program and firms’ managers are risk averse. 
This targeting could be based directly on differences in the risk preferences of individual 
managers, or indirectly on differences in the firms’ characteristics.  However, a regulator must 
have detailed information about managers’ risk preferences, including their coefficients of 
absolute risk aversion. Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that a regulator could screen individual 
managers on the basis of their risk preferences.  It also seems unlikely that a regulator could infer 
this information from observed behavior.  Thus, while a targeted monitoring strategy may be 
justified when firm managers are risk averse, the information requirements for forming such a 
strategy are rather severe. 
Finally, it is important for regulators to understand how risk preferences affect the 
performance of markets for pollution control. I examine the market effects of risk aversion in 
section 4.  Risk aversion will have no impact on rights markets when all firms are compliant, but 
may have significant impacts when there is widespread noncompliance.  In these cases, risk 
aversion is associated with higher permit prices, better environmental quality, and lower 
aggregate violations.   
  
 
2. A Model of Compliance under Emissions Trading 
The analysis of this paper is largely based on a standard model of the decisions of a firm that 
operates under a competitive emissions trading program. It is important to note that the model of 
this paper can be applied to other tradable property rights programs with minor modifications. In 
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fact, recent papers by Hatcher (2005) and Chavez and Salgado (2005) are direct applications of 
the literature on compliance and enforcement of emissions trading to individual transferable 
fishing quotas (ITQs). Thus the results of this paper apply to ITQ policies, as well as to other 
policies that seek to limit some activity through a market for the rights to engage in the activity.  
The firm’s benefit from emissions is ( , ),b q α  which is strictly concave in its emissions q.1 
Absent an inducement to control its emissions, the amount of pollution the firm releases is the 
solution to ( , ) 0qb q α = . Denote this value of q as q0, and let us limit the analysis to emissions 
less than q0.  For  One can think of 0 ,  ( , ) 0.qq q b q α< > ( , )qb q α  as the firm’s marginal 
abatement costs, because it reveals the firm’s reduction in profit from reducing its emissions by 
one unit. Assume that the firm’s benefits from emissions are increasing in the parameter α  so 
that ( , ) 0.b qα α >  Parametric differences in firms’ benefits from emissions are captured by 
differences in α .  
The firm receives  permits initially and holds l permits after trading in a compliance 
period is complete.  Competitive behavior in the permit market establishes a constant price per 
permit p.  Net expenditure or revenue from trading in the permit market is 
0l
0( ).p l l−  
If the firm is noncompliant, its emissions exceed the number of permits it holds and the 
magnitude of its violation is v = q – l > 0. If the firm is compliant, q – l ≤ 0 and v = 0. To check 
for compliance, the firm is audited with a known probability π and is assessed a penalty ( )f v  if it 
is found to be noncompliant. There is no penalty for a zero violation, but the penalty is positive, 
strictly increasing, and strictly convex for positive violations.   
                                                 
1  See Montgomery (1972) for a demonstration of the concavity of profit in emissions for firms that are price-takers 
in input and output markets. Since the formulation of ( , )b q α  is quite general, strict concavity can be guaranteed 
in many non-competitive settings as well.  
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Suppose that the manager of the firm is risk neutral or risk averse, and therefore has a 
concave (perhaps weakly) utility function u. Given the monitoring uncertainty, the manager 
choose the firm’s emissions, q, and violation, v = q – l, to maximize his or her expected utility of 
profit 
      [1] ( ) 0( ) 1 ( ) ( ),U w u w u wπ π= − + 1
where  
       [2] 0 0( , ) ( ),w b q p q v lα= − − −
and  
  1 0( , ) ( ) ( ).w b q p q v l f vα= − − − − 2    [3] 
 Assuming that the firm has positive emissions, its level of emissions is determined by the 
first-order condition, 
  ( )0 1( ) / (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) 0,qU w q u w u w b q pπ π α′ ′⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ = − + − =⎣ ⎦   
which holds if and only if ( , ) .qb q pα =  That is, the manager chooses the firm’s emissions so that 
the marginal benefit from increased emissions is equal to the prevailing permit price. Note that 
this choice depends only on the emissions benefit parameter α  and the going permit price p. 
Therefore, let us write the firm’s optimal emissions as ( , ).q q pα=  Our results about firms’ 
emissions choices are summarized in our first proposition: 
                                                 
2 This description of a manager’s payoff function is easily modified to analyze compliance to an emissions tax 
(Malik 1990). To do so, let l be the firm’s report of its emissions, let p be the fixed unit tax on emissions, and set 
 to reflect the fact that a firm is required to pay for each unit of emissions. The results of this section and the 
next are obtained under the assumption of a fixed permit price. (In section 4 the permit price is determined 
endogenously so that we can examine the market effects of risk aversion.) Therefore, all of the results of these two 
sections, except those involving the effects of , can be directly applied to an analysis of compliance behavior 
under a fixed emissions tax. Recent papers that investigate compliance behavior under an emissions tax include 
Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2005), and Sandmo (2002). Only Sandmo allows for risk aversion, but he 
does not analyze the effects of risk aversion and firm characteristics on compliance behavior, which is the main 
topic of this paper.  
0 0l =
0l
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 Proposition 1: A firm’s choice of emissions is independent of its manager’s risk preference, its 
endowment of permits, and the enforcement strategy it faces.3
 
These independence results are not new. Malik (1990) appears to have been the first to derive 
them in the case of emissions trading. See Harford (1978) and Sandmo (2002) for similar results 
in the case of an emissions tax. 
That a firm’s choice of emissions is independent of its manager’s risk preference, its 
initial allocation of permits, and the enforcement strategy imply that a competitive permit market 
will maximize an industry’s aggregate benefits from emissions when aggregate emissions are 
held to be no more than some fixed standard. In other words, a competitive emissions trading 
policy will minimize an industry’s aggregate costs of holding its emissions to a fixed standard.4 
However, there are situations in which Proposition 1 will fail to hold, yielding an inefficient 
distribution of pollution rights. Obviously, the assumption of competitive permit trading is 
crucial.5 Furthermore, Malik (1990) has shown that if a noncompliant firm’s subjective 
probability of detection is ( , )i i ie lπ , with 0i i i ie lπ π∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ≠ , then it chooses its emissions so 
that its marginal benefit from emissions differs from the permit price. If this is the case, then it is 
                                                 
3 This last independence results does not imply that equilibrium levels of emissions are independent of the 
enforcement strategy.  Enforcement will have an indirect effect on equilibrium emissions through the permit price. 
However, given a permit price, each firms’ choice of emissions are independent of the enforcement strategy it 
faces. Murphy and Stranlund (2006) use laboratory experiments of emissions trading when subjects can be 
noncompliant to confirm the zero direct effect of enforcement on emissions, and a negative indirect effect through 
the impact of enforcement on permit prices.  
4 This has always been an important objective for analysts and policy makers alike. Montgomery’s (1972) seminal 
work on the efficiency of competitive emissions trading takes this approach, as have many papers that have 
followed in the literature on emissions trading. Moreover, the ability of competitive markets to distribute 
emissions control responsibilities efficiently is the main justification for the widespread implementation of these 
markets. 
5 See van Egteren and Weber (1996), Malik (2002), and Chavez and Stranlund (2003) for analyses of compliance 
behavior under emissions trading programs in the presence of market power.  
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unlikely that aggregate benefits from emissions will be maximized. In this paper the detection 
probability a firm faces is common knowledge between the firm and the regulator, and is 
independent of the firm’s permit demand and choice of emissions.  
We can now turn to a firm’s compliance decision, given its optimal choice of emissions. 
Since the condition under which the firm is compliant is an important aspect of this study, its 
violation choice needs to be constrained to be non-negative. The first-order condition for the 
violation level that maximizes [1] subject to this constraint is 
  0 1( ) / (1 ) ( ) ( )( ( )) 0,  if 0,  then 0.vU w v u w p u w p f v vπ π′ ′∂ ∂ = − + − ≤ < =
This condition can be rewritten as: 
0( ) ( , , , , ) 0,  if < 0, then 0,vp f v R v l p vπ α π− ≤ =    [4] 
where 
1 0 1 1
0( , , , , ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).R v l p u w u w u w u w U wα π π π′ ′ ′ ′⎡ ⎤= − + =⎣ ⎦ ′   [5]  
The implicit solution to [4] is the firm’s optimal violation, which is denoted 
  0( , , , ).v v l pα π=        [6] 
The second order condition that guarantees that [4] identifies a unique optimal violation 
requires that 0( ) ( , , , , )vf v R v l pπ α π  is strictly increasing in v.  That is,  It is 
straightforward to demonstrate that this condition holds as long as the firm’s manager is not a 
risk seeker. The consequences of risk seeking behavior are not examined in this paper. Note that 
I have written
0.vv v vf R f R+ >
0( , , , , )R v l pα π  as being independent of the firm’s level of emissions, ( , )q pα . 
This follows from the fact that 1 0 ( , ) 0q q qw w b q pα= = − = , which implies 0qR = . 
0( , , , , )R v l pα π is an adjustment of the marginal expected penalty, ( )vf vπ , that accounts 
for the manager’s attitude toward risk. If the manager is risk neutral, his or her utility function is 
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linear, implying that  and1 0( ) ( )u w u w′ ′= 1.R =  If the firm is compliant, 1R =  as well, because 
 However, if the manager is risk averse, his or her utility function is strictly concave. 
Therefore, if the firm is noncompliant, then  and . Since 
 is a linear combination of , 
. This implies that 
0 .w w= 1
1 0
1
1′
0w w> 1( ) ( )u w u w′ ′>
0(1 ) ( ) ( )u w u wπ π′ ′− + 1 0( ) and ( )u w u w′ ′
1 0( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )u w u w u wπ π′ ′> − + 1R >  for a noncompliant firm with a risk 
averse manager. 
In the case of risk neutrality, it is straightforward to demonstrate Stranlund and Dhanda’s 
(1999) result that the decision to comply and the choice of violation level are independent of any 
firm-specific characteristics. From [4] it is straightforward to establish that a firm with a risk 
neutral manager is compliant if and only if (0)vp fπ≤ ; that is, a firm is compliant if and only if 
the permit price is not greater than marginal expected penalty of a slight violation. Note that the 
firm’s benefits of pollution, as reflected in the parameter ,α  and its initial allocation of permits, 
, do not affect this decision rule. Therefore, a manager’s decision about whether the firm 
should be in compliance is independent of these parameters. This independence extends to the 
violation level of a noncompliant firm as well. To see this, let [4] hold with equality, set 
0l
1R =  
and substitute the firm’s optimal violation [6] to obtain 0( ( , , , )) 0.vp f v l pπ α π− ≡  Differentiate 
this identity with respect to α  to obtain 0,vvf vαπ− =  which implies 0.vα =  This result indicates 
that firms’ violations are independent of parametric differences in their benefits from emissions 
when their managers are risk neutral.  The same is true for differences in firms’ initial permit 
allocations.  
Therefore, as long as managers are risk neutral, there is no reason for regulators to 
believe that some firms will be more likely to be noncompliant, or tend toward higher violations, 
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even though they may have very different benefits from emissions or initial permit allocations. 
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the marginal productivity of increased enforcement 
in reducing violations will differ among firms.  Hence, a regulator that is motivated to target its 
enforcement resources to reduce incidences of noncompliance cannot do so on the basis of firm-
level characteristics when managers are risk neutral. In the next section I examine whether this 
result continues to hold when managers are risk averse.  
 
3. Risk Aversion and Compliance Behavior 
In this section let us analyze the compliance behavior of firms when their managers are risk 
averse. We begin with a firm’s decision to be compliant or not. Perhaps surprisingly, a 
manager’s risk preference has no bearing on whether his or her firm will be compliant. That is, 
regardless of the manager’s attitude toward risk, the firm is compliant if and only if (0)vp fπ≤ . 
To prove the “only if” part of this assertion, first note that if v = 0, then  and 0w w= 1 1.R =  From 
[4], then, it is clear that v = 0 requires (0)vp fπ≤ . To prove that v = 0  if (0)vp fπ≤ , recall that 
the second order condition for the determination of v requires that ( )vf v Rπ  is strictly increasing 
in v. This and 1R = when v = 0 imply ( ) (0)v vf v R fπ π>  for . In turn, if 0v > (0)vp fπ≤ , then 
( ) 0vp f v Rπ− <  for .  From [4], however, 0v > ( ) 0vp f v Rπ− <  for  implies that the 
optimal choice of violation is v = 0.  Therefore, we conclude that v = 0 if 
0v >
(0)vp fπ≤ . 
Since a manager’s decision about whether his or her firm should comply depends only on 
the prevailing permit price and the enforcement strategy, we have the following proposition: 
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Proposition 2:  A firm is compliant if and only if (0)vp fπ≤ . Therefore, whether a firm is 
compliant or not is independent of its benefits from emissions, its endowment of permits, and its 
manager’s risk preference. 
 
Proposition 2 implies that firms with risk averse managers are not more (or less) likely to 
be compliant than firms with risk neutral managers. This result has important implications. 
Suppose that a regulator’s objective is to use its enforcement strategy to induce full compliance 
to an emissions trading policy. One may suspect that it would be easier to induce full compliance 
by firms with risk averse managers than to induce compliance by firms with risk neutral 
managers, but this is clearly not the case. That a firm’s decision to comply or not is also 
independent of its benefit from emissions and its initial allocation of permits implies that a 
regulator with the objective of inducing complete compliance should not pursue a targeted 
monitoring strategy. Minimizing the enforcement costs of inducing full compliance implies 
uniform monitoring of firms so that (0)vp fπ= .   
While a firm with a risk averse manager is not more likely to be noncompliant than a firm 
with a risk neutral manager, a noncompliant firm with a risk averse manager will choose a lower 
violation than an otherwise identical noncompliant firm with a risk neutral manager. This follows 
from the fact that 1R =  for a risk neutral manager and 1R >  for a risk averse manager; that is, 
the expected marginal disutility of being penalized for a particular violation level is higher for a 
risk averse manager than for a risk neutral manager. In principle, with information on the risk 
preferences of individual managers, a regulator could target its enforcement effort based on this 
information. However, it seems unlikely that a regulator could categorize or screen managers on 
the basis of their risk preferences.  
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There remains the possibility, however, that a regulator can use observable information 
that is correlated with firms’ benefits from emissions to target its monitoring effort when firms 
have risk averse managers. This information may include observable characteristics of 
production technologies, levels of inputs and outputs, abatement equipment, or their initial 
allocations of permits. To determine whether it is possible for a regulator to do this, we need to 
determine whether a firm’s violation depends on the parameter α , or on its initial allocation of 
permits, . Using [4] and [6], write the identity 0l
  0( ) ( , , , , ) 0vp f v R v l pπ α π− ≡ .     [7] 
From [7] obtain vv R fθ θ= − S , where 0( , )lθ α∈ and 0vv v vS f R f R= + > , which is required by 
the second order condition for determining an optimal violation.  Since , the sign of 0vf > vθ  is 
equal to the sign of Rθ− . Using [5], one can calculate  
  1 1 0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,R Ab u w u w u w u wα α ′′ ′ ′′ ′⎡ ⎤− = − +⎣ ⎦    [8] 
and 
  
0
1 1 0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,lR Ap u w u w u w u w′′ ′ ′′ ′⎡ ⎤− = − +⎣ ⎦   [9] 
where [ ]21 0(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0.A u w u w U wπ ′ ′ ′= − >  Since , 0bα > 0 and lR Rα− − have the same sign as 
1 1 0( ) ( ) ( ) (u w u w u w u w′′ ′ ′′ ′− + 0 ) . Therefore, 
0
and lvα v  have the same sign as this term as well.  
  However, ( ) ( )u w u w′′ ′−  is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion and the 
sign of 1 1 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )u w u w u w u w′′ ′ ′′ ′− + 0
1
 is simply a statement of whether the manager’s utility 
function exhibits decreasing, constant, or increasing absolute risk aversion (Mas-Colell,et.al. 
1995, pg. 193). Since from [2] and [3], , if the manager’s utility function exhibits 
decreasing absolute risk aversion, then 
0w w>
1 1 0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0u w u w u w u w′′ ′ ′′ ′ .− + >  With constant 
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absolute risk aversion this term is equal to zero, and with increasing absolute risk aversion this 
term is negative. Therefore, for a noncompliant firm with a risk averse manager we have the 
following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: The violation of a noncompliant firm with a risk averse manager is independent 
of its benefits from emissions and its endowment of permits if and only if the manager’s utility 
function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion. If the manager’s utility function exhibits 
decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion, the firm’s violation is increasing (decreasing) in 
its benefits from emissions and its endowment of permits. 
 
Violation levels of noncompliant firms are independent of parametric differences in their 
benefits from emissions and in their initial allocations of permits if the firms’ managers have 
utility functions that exhibit constant absolute risk aversion. This is a generalization of Stranlund 
and Dhanda’s (1999) independence result that they obtained under the assumption of risk neutral 
managers. However, these results do not hold with non-constant absolute risk aversion. A firm’s 
violation is increasing (decreasing) in its benefits from emissions and its initial allocation of 
permits if and only if its manager’s utility exhibits decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion. 
Managers with decreasing absolute risk aversion take on more risk as their firms become more 
profitable. Given a choice of emissions and permit demand, a higher value of α  or a larger 
initial allocation of permits both imply that a firm is more profitable.  If the firm’s manager has 
decreasing absolute risk aversion, then higher values of these parameters (higher profitability) 
lead the manager to take on more risk, and hence, to choose a higher violation.  The opposite is 
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true if the manager has increasing absolute risk aversion, because then he or she is motivated to 
take on less risk when the firm is more profitable.  
The policy implication of Proposition 3 is that firms’ violations are not independent of 
their benefits from emissions or initial allocations if their managers are risk averse with utility 
functions that exhibit non-constant absolute risk aversion. In principle, then, a regulator would be 
able to form a targeted monitoring strategy based on observable differences in firm’s initial 
allocations of permits and on characteristics that determine their benefits from emissions. To do 
so, however, requires rather detailed information about individual managers’ risk preferences. It 
is important to note that it is simply not enough know, or assume, that managers are risk averse. 
If risk averse managers have constant absolute risk aversion, there is no justification for a 
targeted monitoring strategy that is based on firm-level characteristics. A targeted strategy is 
justified only when a regulator knows whether managers have increasing or decreasing absolute 
risk aversion. Unfortunately, it does not seem likely that a regulator could ever obtain this 
information, or infer it from observations of firm behavior. Thus, although a targeted monitoring 
strategy may be justified when firm managers are risk averse, the information requirements for 
forming such a strategy are rather severe.  
 
4. Market Effects of Risk Aversion 
Up to this point the analysis has been conducted under the assumption of a fixed price for 
emissions rights. However, any analysis of compliance behavior under tradable property rights 
must ultimately make the price of these rights endogenous. Perhaps the most important reason 
for doing so is that firms’ compliance choices are linked together by the market for property 
rights. This is one of the features of market-based environmental and natural resource policies 
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that distinguish them from command-and-control regulations and from taxes.  
Let us consider the following thought experiment. Start from a situation in which all the 
firms in an emissions trading program are noncompliant and all their managers are risk neutral. 
Then, let us replace a significant number, but not all, of the firms’ managers with risk averse 
managers. Doing so allows us to trace out the effects of risk aversion on the equilibrium permit 
price, aggregate emissions, aggregate violations, as well as the violations of the firms with their 
new risk averse managers and the violations of those that keep their risk neutral managers. 
 Suppose that a fixed number of emissions permits are in circulation, and that when all the 
managers are risk neutral, all firms violate their permits so that aggregate emissions exceed the 
number of permits in circulation. Now replace a significant number of the firms’ managers with 
risk averse individuals. Recall that risk averse managers will choose lower violations for their 
firms than their risk neutral counterparts. Thus, holding the permit price constant, the firms that 
acquire a risk averse manager will reduce their violations.  In principle, these firms could reduce 
their violations by purchasing more permits or by reducing their emissions. However, recall that 
a firm’s level of emissions is independent of its manager’s preference for risk (Proposition 1). 
Therefore, holding the permit price constant, firms with risk averse managers will reduce their 
violations by demanding more permits, not by reducing their emissions. 
 Clearly the increased permit demand by the firms who now have risk averse managers 
will increase the equilibrium permit price. In response to this increase in the permit price, all 
firms will reduce their emissions. To see why, recall that a firm’s choice of emissions, 
( , )q q pα= , is determined from the first-order condition ( , ) .qb q pα =  From this condition 
obtain 1/ 0,p qqq b= <  which implies that each firms’ emissions are decreasing in the price of 
emissions permits. Thus, relative to a situation involving noncompliant firms with risk neutral 
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managers, replacing a significant number of these managers with risk averse individuals will 
induce a higher equilibrium permit price and lower aggregate emissions. Of course, given a fixed 
supply of emissions permits, lower aggregate emissions imply lower aggregate violations. We 
conclude, therefore, that under market-based environmental policies with widespread 
noncompliance, risk aversion is associated with higher permit prices, better environmental 
quality, and higher aggregate compliance. 
  However, higher aggregate compliance does not imply lower violations by all firms. In 
fact, a significant number of risk averse managers will lead to higher violations by the firms with 
risk neutral managers. To demonstrate this, recall that equation [7] is the first-order condition for 
a positive violation by a firm evaluated at its optimal violation 0( , , , )v l pα π .  Also recall that if 
the firm’s manager is risk neutral, then 0( , , , , ) 1R v l pα π = . From ( ) 0vp f vπ− ≡ , then, obtain 
1/ 0,p vvv fπ= >  which indicates that the violation of a firm with a risk neutral manager is 
increasing in the price of permits. Since a significant number of risk averse managers will tend to 
push the equilibrium permit price up because they demand more permits, their behavior will also 
lead the firms with risk neutral managers to increase their violations.  
 Our conclusions about the effects of risk aversion on transferable permit market 
outcomes are summarized in our final proposition.  
 
Proposition 4: Relative to a market involving noncompliant firms with risk neutral managers, an 
otherwise identical market but with a significant number of risk averse managers will have (1) a 
higher equilibrium permit price, (2) lower emissions by all firms, (3) lower aggregate violations, 
but (4) higher violations by the firms with risk neutral managers.  
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In contrast, risk aversion will have no impact on permit markets when all firms are 
compliant. That is, suppose we started from a situation involving compliant firms with risk 
neutral managers. Replacing some or all of the managers with risk averse managers will have no 
affect on equilibrium outcomes, because these new managers will also choose compliance for 
their firms. This follows from Proposition 2, which states that a firm’s decision to be compliant 
is independent of the risk preference of its manager. 
Therefore, the market effects of risk aversion are limited to situations involving 
widespread noncompliance. In these cases, risk aversion produces better environmental quality 
and lower aggregate violations. However, regulators need to always be aware of indirect price 
effects under tradable rights regulations. The lower violations of firms with risk averse managers 
puts upward pressure on the market price of rights, which in turn motivates firms with risk 
neutral managers toward higher violations. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We have examined the consequences of risk aversion on compliance behavior in markets for 
pollution control, and have obtained several new results with significant policy implications. 
First, a firm’s decision about whether to comply or not is independent of its manager’s risk 
preference; that is, firms with risk averse managers are not more (or less) likely to be compliant 
than firms with risk neutral (or even risk loving) managers. Thus, if the objective of a regulator is 
to enforce an emissions trading policy so that all firms that operate under the policy are fully 
compliant, the distribution of risk preferences among the managers of the firms has no bearing 
on what is required to achieve this objective. Moreover, one cannot justify a targeted 
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enforcement strategy that involves monitoring firms with certain characteristics more closely 
than others. 
However, risk preferences do play a role in determining the violation levels of 
noncompliant firms. While noncompliant firms with risk averse managers will have lower 
violations than otherwise identical firms with risk neutral managers, the effects of differences in 
firms’ emissions benefits and their initial permit allocations on their violation choices depend 
critically on their managers’ coefficients of absolute risk aversion. A firm’s violation is 
independent of these characteristics if its manager’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion is 
constant over profit levels. However, higher (lower) violations are associated with higher (lower) 
emissions benefits and initial permit allocations when a manager’s coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion is decreasing (increasing) in profit levels.  
 In principle, a regulator could target its enforcement effort based directly on the risk 
preferences of individual managers, or indirectly on differences in the firms’ characteristics. 
However, doing so requires that there is significant noncompliance to an emissions trading 
policy. Moreover, the regulator must have detailed information about managers’ risk preferences, 
including whether their utility functions exhibit increasing, decreasing, or constant absolute risk 
aversion. Although a targeted monitoring strategy may be justified when firm managers are risk 
averse, the information requirements for forming such a strategy appear prohibitive. 
It is important, however, for regulators to understand how risk preferences affect the 
performance of tradable rights regulations. We have seen that risk aversion will have no impact 
on markets for pollution control when all firms are compliant, but may have significant impacts 
when there is widespread noncompliance.  In these cases, risk aversion is associated with higher 
permit prices, lower aggregate violations, and better environmental quality.   
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